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WHEN THE ICC COMES KNOCKING, THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD WELCOME IT WITH OPEN ARMS
Brittney A. Dimond*
Abstract: The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
requested approval to open a formal investigation into war crimes and crimes against
humanity allegedly committed in Afghanistan since May 2003. If the investigation is
approved, the United States
will have significant implications not only for
relations going forward between the United States and the ICC, but also for the
Three of the United
States
include: (1) declining to cooperate with the ICC based on a denial of jurisdiction due to a
lack of U.S.
inadmissible to the Court pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity; or (3) contesting
ding agreements made between the United States
and Afghanistan. Each of these responses find footing in legal arguments centered on the
tension between international jurisdiction and sovereignty. However, waiving
jurisdictional challenges specific to this investigation, the United States has a fourth option:
compliance. Although unlikely to actualize, this course would position the United States
as a global leader for human rights, bolster any future efforts to enforce prosecution against
international criminals, and provide much needed recourse to victims of war crimes.
Cite as: Brittney A. Dimond, When the ICC Comes Knocking, the United States Should
Welcome It with Open Arms, 28 WASH. INT L L.J. 181 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (ICC
) is a treaty-based
international organization centered around a permanent court that was
established for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. Advocates
for the ICC contend that the Court is a vital tool that allows the international
community to hold perpetrators of heinous crimes accountable for actions that
might otherwise go unpunished.
completed ten formal investigations
resulting in
three defendants being found guilty of their charged crime(s), six cases ending
in either acquittal or dismissal, and one case currently on appeal.1 In addition,

* Brittney A. Dimond is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington and is expected to graduate
in June 2019. The author received a B.A. in Political Science and Communications from the University of
Washington. She would like to thank Professor Andrew Cockrell for sparking an interest in the topic,
Professor Melissa Durkee for her continued guidance, and Norman Dimond for everything.
1
Situations Under Investigation, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last
visited Aug. 16, 2018).
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the ICC currently has eleven situations under investigation as well as eleven
preliminary examinations pending before it.2
One of these elven preliminary examinations that has spurred debate
among the international community is the
Fatou Bensouda, to the Pre-Trial Chamber to approve the initiation of a formal
investigation into alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
in Afghanistan since May 2003.3 If the Pre-Trial Chamber grants this request,
it will be significant for two reasons: first, it will be only the second
investigation into a situation that occurred outside of Africa;4 and second, the
investigation is likely to include, within its scope, allegations against
American military and CIA personnel. 5 If the Afghanistan investigation
moves forward, it may help ease criticism that the Court is biased against
African countries;6 however, it would likely also trigger international dispute
United States has not ratified the treaty
that created the Court and has since rejected ICC claims of authority over U.S.
persons. 7 If the ICC pursues an investigation in Afghanistan that includes
allegations against American officials, the United States
consequences not only for the individuals facing accusations, but also the
international community at large.
This comment begins with a brief background regarding the
establishment of the ICC, the C
pending
Afghanistan investigation that might implicate American nationals. It then
explores four possible options the United States could pursue in response to
an ICC investigation, and considers the comparative strengths and weakness
2

Id.
Preliminary Examinations, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/PreliminaryExaminations.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). When, as in this case, the Prosecutor opens a preliminary
examination proprio motu, on her own authority, instead of acting upon a request from a States Party or a
investigation to begin. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4
INT L CRIM. CT., supra note 1.
5
INT L CRIM. CT.: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES
2016 43 50 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
6
See Tessa Alleblas, Eamon Aloya, Geoff Dancy & Yvonne Dutton, Is the International
Criminal Court Biased Against Africans? Kenyan Victims
Think So, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/06/is-the-international-criminal-courtbiased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-dont-think-so/.
7
Steven Groves & Brett Schaefer, The ICC Investigation in Afghanistan Vindicates U.S. Policy
Toward the ICC, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-icc-investigationafghanistan-vindicates-us-policy-toward-the-icc#_ftn7.
3

January 2019

When the ICC Comes Knocking

183

of each. This comment concludes that the correct course, although the most
unlikely, is for the United States to comply
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Allied nations held criminal trials
imposing individual liability upon offenders, including military leaders and
personnel, for the crimes committed during the conflict.8 Commentators point
to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as a turning point that set the stage for
the international community to recognize individual responsibility, instead of
state accountability, for certain egregious crimes committed during times of
war and peace. 9 During the Genocide Convention, the U.N. General
Assembly recognized the need for a permanent international court to
investigate and adjudicate certain categories of atrocities that had been
recognized as international crimes.10 Following the Cold War, nations came
together to negotiate the creation of such a court. 11 However, while
negotiations for the ICC statute were underway, heinous crimes were being
committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In response to these
atrocities, the U.N. Security Council established ad hoc tribunals for each
situation.12 Undeniably, these events played a role in the decision to convene
the conference that established the ICC in Rome during the summer of 1998.13
In July of 1998, a conference of 160 States established the first treatybased permanent international criminal court.14 In addition to instituting the
ICC, the Rome Statute outlines the C
diction, defines the crimes
that fall within that jurisdiction, includes the
al rules, and
establishes the mechanisms for States to cooperate with the ICC.15 Unlike its
predecessor courts, the ICC was created through a multilateral treaty and is

8
The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948), OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
9
INT L CRIM. CT., UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Rome Statute art. 36, ¶ 1.
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not an organ of the U.N.; as such, its jurisdictional force is rooted upon the
consent of member parties
. 16
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 in accordance with
the entry into force provision of Article 126.17 Although 120 states adopted
the Rome Statute in 1988, informally establishing the court, only 60 countries
ratified the statute when it entered into force in 2002.18 As of 2018, there were
138 signatories and 123 States Parties to the treaty.19 Unlike States Parties,
signatory members are not legally bound by the provisions of the Rome
Statute and only agree to act in good faith
20
At one point, there were 124 States Parties of the ICC;
however, in 2017, Burundi became the first nation to withdraw from the Rome
Statute. Since then, several other nations including Gambia, Russia, South
Africa, and the Philippines have announced intentions to do the same but
have yet to formally withdraw. 21 Of the ICC members, [33] are African
States, [19] are Asia-Pacific States, [18] are Eastern European States, [28] are
Latin American or Caribbean States, and [25] are Western European States. 22
Despite overwhelming support by many of
-states
and the United States initial key role as a negotiating party of the statute, the
United States has taken extraordinary steps to exempt itself from the
jurisdiction of the court. The United States was deeply involved in the
negotiations of the Rome Statute in the 1990s; however, it ultimately voted
against adoption at the 1998 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.23
Since then, U.S. support of the ICC has waxed and waned with each
administration. In 2000, President Clinton authorized the United States to sign
the Rome Statute but did not submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and

16

Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
Rome Statute art. 126.
18
International
Criminal
Court
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/world/international-criminal-court-fast-facts/index.html.
19
U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 13,
2017), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII10&chapter=18&clang=_en#bottom.
20
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21
CNN, supra note 18.
22
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT L CRIM. CT, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/
states%20parties/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
23
See David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-atState in Peace, Security, and Justice, Statement on Creating an International Criminal Court (Aug. 31, 1998).
17
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consent as is necessary for ratification.24

nited States from
ICC jurisdiction.25 While the Obama Administration was more supportive of
the ICC as demonstrated by its participation in ICC meetings, supporting a
vote for a Security Council referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, and
turning two individuals over to the ICC for alleged crimes in Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo it did not re-sign the Rome Statute or
seek ratification.26 The Trump administration has yet to directly address the
subject of the U.S.-ICC relationship, except for the Draft Executive Order to
establish a committee to consider cutting funding even though the United
States does not fund the ICC and funding the Court is expressly illegal under
the American Service Members Protection Act.27
B.
he drafters of the Rome Statute
sought to balance a respect for state sovereignty with the desire to protect the
inalienability of human rights and avenge violations of such rights.28 As such,
the Court has a limited mandate to try individuals (rather than States), and to
hold such persons accountable for the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.29
The fourth crime the crime of aggression has been a tricky issue for
the ICC since its inception.30 Although initially included as one of the crimes
that the ICC had jurisdiction over, the parties to the treaty failed to agree on a
definition for the crime and under what terms it could be brought.31 Without
an agreed upon definition, the Court was unable to investigate allegations of

24
Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Statement Authorizing the US Signing of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, Statement at Camp David (Dec. 31, 2000).
25

May 6, 2002) (transcript available from author).
See generally, Obama Administration, AM. NGO COALITION FOR THE INT L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.amicc.org/obama-administration (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
27
Trump
Administration, AM. NGO COALITION FOR THE INT L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.amicc.org/trump-administration (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
28
See Kielsgard, supra note 16.
29
Rome Statute, art. 5; UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 9.
30
Desmnd Davies, ICC Crime of Aggression Finally Activated, GHANA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 30,
2018), http://www.ghananewsagency.org/world/icc-crime-of-aggression-finally-activated-128060.
31
Id.
26

186

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 1

32
crimes of aggression,
Commentators saw the prolonged debate as a move by powerful states, many
with a propensity for aggression against weaker states, to delay the process
for as long as possible to further shield their conduct from repercussions.33 On
the other hand, those that opposed including the crime of aggression within
argued that the looming threat of prosecution would
have a chilling effect on coalition building between nations seeking to address
massive humanitarian emergencies with military responses, especially in light
of the increasing difficulty of securing Security Council authorization for such
efforts given the often conflicting interests of voting nations.34

Interestingly, a consensus on the definition of the crime was reached in
2009. However, that definition was not included in a resolution for ratified
until 2017 at the 16th Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute in New
York.35 After the resolution passed, the current definition entered into force
on July 17, 2018.36 However, the resolution is only applicable to ICC member
states that ratified or accepted the Amendment to the Rome Statute, which at
this time consists of only thirty-five states.37
According to the Rome Statute, the Court secures its jurisdiction
through the treaty-based consent of member states which grants the Court
authority over the enumerated offenses.38 Such jurisdiction is distinct from
that of universal jurisdiction, which relates to the ability and obligation of
national courts to investigate and prosecute particularly egregious crimes
including all of the crimes enumerated within
l scope.39

32
Alex Whiting, Crime of Aggression Activated at the ICC: Does it Matter?, JUST SECURITY, (Dec.
19, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/49859/crime-aggression-activated-icc-matter/.
33
Davies, supra note 30.
34
See Whiting, supra note 32.
35
Davies, supra note 30.
36
Id.
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of th
art. 8, ¶ 1.
37
Davies, supra note 30.
38
Rome Statute art. 12.
39
Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction Prepared for the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-factsuniversal-jurisdiction.
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Significantly, universal jurisdiction applies only to nations and is therefore
not an available source of jurisdiction for the ICC.40
In order for a case to be justiciable before the ICC, jurisdiction must be
proper, which includes temporal, subject matter, and territorial jurisdiction
elements. 41 Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be proper, the crimes in
question must: (1) have been committed after the inception of the ICC or after
the relevant State Party joined the ICC; (2) fall within the definition of at least
one of the four expressed crimes; and (3) have been committed by a member
42

Under Article 13 of the Rome Statute, there are three ways an
investigation may be initiated.43 Investigations may be referred to the Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) by either State Parties or the Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.44 In addition,
the Prosecutor45 may initiate an investigation in respect to the relevant crimes,
proprio motu, or at his or her own discretion, but under such circumstance the
Rome Statute requires Pre-Trial Chamber approval to move forward.46
C.

The Investigation

On November 3, 2017, the Prosecutor for the ICC, Fatou Bensouda,
announced her formal request for
Pre-Trial
Chamber to open an official investigation into war crimes and crimes against
humanity allegedly committed in Afghanistan since May 2003. 47 This
announcement came after the
decade-long preliminary
40
Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV. INT L L.J. 358,
365 (2012).
41
Laura Dickinson & Alex Whiting, Expert Q&A: The International Criminal Court
Afghanistan Probe and the US, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54276/backgr
ounder-icc-afghanistan-probe-us-expert-qa/.
42
Rome Statute art. 12.
43
Office of the Prosecutor, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp (last visited, Nov. 5,
2018).
44
Rome Statute art. 13.
45
The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent organ of the Court that is responsible for

Deputy Prosecutor are elected by the Assembly of States Parties for a non-renewable nine-year term. The
current Prosecutor is Ms. Fatou Bensouda from The Gambia. See Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 43.
46
Id.; see also, Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41.
47

Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov.
3, 2017) (transcript available from author).
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investigation into the situation.48 Although the ICC was established in 2002,
Afghanistan did not accede to the Rome Statute until 2003; therefore, the ICC
does not have the authority to investigate crimes committed in Afghanistan
before the indicated dates.49
If approved, the investigation will focus on alleged crimes committed
by the Taliban, ISIS, Afghan security forces, warlords, the U.S.-led coalition,
and others during the lengthy wars in Afghanistan.50 It was reported that the
Court received over a million allegations of abuses and atrocities in relation
to the proposed investigation.51 Although the details of the request have not
been released, Bensouda has previously indicated that the investigation could
include allegations of torture and misconduct by U.S. military forces in
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2004, as well as at CIA facilities in Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania, all of which are ICC state members.52
Because the Prosecutor has proceeded proprio motu, on her own
authority, instead of acting upon a request from a States Party or a Security
Council request,
-Trial Chamber must approve the
53
P
No official deadline was given for the judges to
; 54 however, close observers of the ICC
55
consider approval very likely. Pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute,
the Prere is a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation after considering the same
factors addressed by the Prosecutor in making her decision to initiate the
request primarily jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests of justice.56

48
Katherine Gallagher, The ICC Must Hold the US Accountable for Crimes in Afghanistan, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/16/icc-us-accountable-for-crimesafghanistan.
49
Rome Statute art. 11(1).
50
David Davenport, Will the International Criminal Court Prosecute American Over Afghanistan?,
FORBES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2018/03/26/will-the-internationalcriminal-court-prosecute-americans-over-afghanistan/.
51
Id.
52
INT L CRIM. CT., supra note 5.
53
Rome Statute art. 13.
54
James McAuley, ICC Prosecutor Seeks Probe into War Crimes Allegations Against U.S.
Military, CIA in Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/icc-prosecutor-seeks-probe-into-war-crimes-allegations-against-us-military-cia-in-afghanistan/
2017/11/20/e8ec73b8-ce1e-11e7-a87b-47f14b73162a_story.html.
55
Kevin Jon Heller,
OPINIO JURIS
(Nov. 3, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/11/03/otp-decides-to-investigate-the-situation-in-afghanistan/.
56
Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41.

January 2019

When the ICC Comes Knocking

189

At this stage, the Pre-Trial Chamber makes these determinations with
respect to the situation as a whole, not necessarily with respect to each
individual potential case.57 If the requirements to approve the investigation
are satisfied by some of the potential cases within the situation, that would be
sufficient to authorize the investigation into the entire situation. So even if
there exist possible jurisdictional or admissibility challenges to particular
potential cases within a situation, it is not necessary that the Pre-Trial
Chamber resolve such issues at this stage or deny the investigation in its
entirety. 58 Although, the Pre-Trial Chamber likely could, if it wished to,
resolve such issues if they were formally raised.59
In a statement given on December 8, 2017, at the 16th Session of the
Assembly of State Parties, a representative for the United States reaffirmed
the United States
nationals of States that are not parties to the Rome Statute, absent a UN
60
The representative
went on to formally object to the proposed investigation involving U.S.
personal in the Afghanistan situation and to remind those in attendance that
while the United States
States
P
refusal to join the ICC and place its citizens under the
61

II.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE OPTIONS

The United States has, since the founding of the Court, maintained its
position that the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over Americans because the

57

Id.
Id.
59
Rome Statute art. 19, ¶¶ 4, 6. The Statute expressly permits states to weigh in at this stage only on
the narrow issue of whether it is investigating and prosecuting the same persons for the same potential crimes
for purposes of determining if the doctrine of complementarity precludes ICC jurisdiction. However, Rule
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a
State, organization or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any issue that the Chamber
-trial Chamber would permit any
state implicated by the proceedings, such as the United States, to submit its observations at any stage of the
proceedings on any matter. Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41.
60
Statement on Behalf of the United States of America 16th Session of the Assembly of States
Parties, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/unitedstates-statement-international-criminal-court-icc-afghanistan-december-2017.pdf.
61
Id.
58
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United States has not ratified the Rome Statute.62 On the other hand, the ICC
upholds its position that it does have jurisdiction over American
conduct in Afghanistan because the latter is a member state that has, by
acceding to the Rome Statute, granted the ICC jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed within its territory.63 While it is uncertain if the Pre-Trial Chamber
to open an investigation regarding the
conduct of American officials in Afghanistan or elsewhere, the United States
would have to decide how to respond if such approval is attained.
This paper evaluates four possible approaches the United States could
take in its response to an ICC investigation: (1) refuse to cooperate with the
ICC based on a denial of jurisdiction due to a lack of U.S. consent; (2)
c
that the situation is inadmissible
for the Court pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity; (3) r
jurisdiction as precluded by binding agreements made between the United
States and Afghanistan; or (4) accede jurisdiction specific to this investigation
and comply with ICC requests. Scholars and commentators consider the first
three the more likely possibilities. This comment considers the varying legal
legitimacy of each, after which this comment argues that instead of denying
egal basis, the United
States should comply with the investigation in order to best serve its political
and humanitarian goals.
A.

Option 1: Deny Jurisdiction Based on a Lack of Consent

obligations are based upon its expressed consent to be bound through
ratification of agreed-upon commitments or a long-standing practice and
observance among sovereign nations sufficient to create an international
custom.64 If a state freely chooses to subject its citizens to the jurisdiction of
the ICC by signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, then that is its choice.65

62
David Bosco, US Options for Responding to ICC Scrutiny in Afghanistan, LAWFARE (Feb. 23,
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-options-responding-icc-scrutiny-afghanistan.
63
Id. (relying on Rome Statute art. 12, ¶ 2(a)).
64
See Joshua Wood, What is Customary International Law, RULE OF LAW INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/what-is-customary-international-law/.
65
Brett Schaefer, How the U.S. Should Respond to ICC Investigation into Alleged Crimes in
Afghanistan, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/how-the-us-shouldrespond-icc-investigation-alleged-crimes-afghanistan.
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The United States has not made that decision and as such, arguably should not
be subject to ICC jurisdiction absent its consent.66
This position, as historically relied upon by the United States, has
limited support among the international community because most legal
scholars believe that ICC member states are able to delegate to the Court the
criminal jurisdiction states inherently have over their own territory. 67
Additionally, there is an argument that by choosing to keep military personnel
in the territory of a States Party to the ICC, 68 the United States tacitly
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC because, as one of the primary parties
to the initial negotiations of the Rome Statute, the United States was cognizant
of the C
including Article 12(2)(a) which
provides for jurisdiction over all conduct occurring within the territory of a
member state.69
provisions, the United States has arguably implicitly indicated its recognition
legitimate jurisdiction over non-member states through state
territorial jurisdiction delegation when it insisted upon a bilateral agreement
with Afghanistan to allow the United States to maintain exclusive jurisdiction
over U.S. military and supporting personnel working in Afghanistan.70 While
accession to the Rome Statute, multiple agreements were re-negotiated in
2014, as the NATO International Security Assistance Force mission was
advise a
being arranged. 71 The renewed agreements required that the United States
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal conduct committed by its
nationals as a precondition for continued military support. 72 The demanded
prerequisite suggests a recognition that without such an agreement American

66

See Kielsgard, supra note 16.
Bosco, supra note 62.
68
The Rome Statute went into effect in Afghanistan after the United States already had a military
presence in the country; therefore, the Court only has jurisdiction over conduct occurring after May 2003
even though U.S. personnel were present beginning in 2001 .
69
Rome Statute art. 12, ¶ 2(a).
70
Schaefer, supra note 65.
71
INT L SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP T OF STATE, REPORT ON STATUS OF FORCE
AGREEMENTS 42 (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf.
72
Id.
67
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officials could be subjected to Afghan jurisdiction or, perhaps, that such
jurisdiction could be delegated to the ICC.
However, even if the United States
Court could
be interpreted as implicit consent to its jurisdiction, in light of the fact that the
United States has not signed or ratified the Rome Statute, it is under no treaty
or legal obligation to comply with the ICC prosecutor or investigation. 73
Furthermore, the American Serviceextradition, or prosecution of any United States citizen or permanent resident
74
alien by the International Cr
In order to avoid the possibility
of inferred waivers of ASPA restrictions on U.S. cooperation with the ICC
investigation, some commenters have recommended that the United States
reject any ICC requests pertaining to the Afghanistan investigation.75 They
argue that cooperating with the ICC investigation could give the impression
that the United States
over
this investigation.76
In addition, those advocating for the United States
comply
suggest that the United States should remind all governments with which it
has Article 98 agreements that they are prohibited from surrendering U.S.
persons to the Court or to any third party that has the intent to surrender U.S.
persons to the Court. 77 The United States began negotiating Article 98
agreements sometimes referred to as bilateral immunity agreements or
bilateral non-surrender agreements in 2002 and has concluded at least one
hundred such agreements.78 Further, in order to avoid tacit endorsement of the
ICC legitimacy, these commentators also advise that the United States
reassess its support for the ICC. 79 While, as previously noted, the United
States has never been a member state of the Rome Statute, it has supported
the Court in various ways, including voting for Security Council referrals of
situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC.80 Moving forward, if the United
States pursues this route, it would have to ensure its relationship and
73

Rome Statute art. 87.
22 U.S.C. § 7423(f) (2002).
75
Schaefer, supra note 65.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
International Criminal Court - Article 98 Agreements Research Guide, GEORGETOWN L. LIB.
http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/article_98 (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
79
Schafer, supra note 65.
80
Id.
74
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interactions with the Court could not be interpret
jurisdiction.81
Without assistance or cooperation from the United States in its
investigation, there is a chance that the Prosecutor will be unable to develop
enough information to bring formal charges against American officials.82 At
the very least, ignoring the investigation until formal charges have been
pressed would allow the United States to defer a decision on how to respond
until it no longer had a choice.83 The delay and defer course of action allows
the United States to avoid any diplomatic reverberations that may result from
a head-on confrontation with the ICC, which would be especially
advantageous if the investigation ultimately does not result in any formal
charges and the issue of jurisdiction could be adjourned for another day.84
However, by simply ignoring the investigation, the United States puts
itself at risk of the ICC interpreting its muted response as evidence of an
acquiescence to
jurisdiction. 85 The Rome Statute
specifies that if a State wishes to challenge the
, it shall
86
If the United States does
not raise a challenge in the near future, it risks that future challenges could be
considered waived. However, note that the individuals in question would still
retain their ability to raise jurisdictional challenges until after they are
formally charged and a trial has commenced.87
The decision to delay and defer in response to the initiation of an
investigation by the ICC based on a denial of ICC jurisdiction over the
situation at hand would be contingent on the United S
confidence that
the probability of formal charges being pressed against American officials is
minimal. If such a conclusion were reached, the strategy would allow for the
United States to maintain a friendly, though minimalistic, relationship with

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Bosco, supra note 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rome Statute art. 19, ¶ 5.
Note that Article 19 paragraph 4 states,

are no guidelines for what would be considered an exceptional circumstance. Rome Statute art. 19, ¶ 4.
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the Court, which has broadly served U.S. interests by addressing mass
atrocities around the world.88
B.

Option 2: Challenge Jurisdiction Based on the Doctrine of
Complementarity

Under the Rome Statute, the ICC must respect the doctrine of
complementarity in regards to domestic jurisdiction.89 This means a case is
inadmissible unless the states with domestic jurisdiction over the situation are
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute the situation. 90 Article 18 of the
Rome Statute specifies that,
notification,
a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its
nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which
91
In her statement announcing the decision to pursue
the investigation at issue, the Prosecutor noted:
In undertaking this work, if authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber,
my Office will continue to fully respect the principle of
complementarity, taking into account any relevant genuine
national proceedings, including those that may be undertaken
even after an investigation is authorised, within the Rome Statute
framework.92
Indicating that, even though the United States missed the one-month deadline
prescribed by the statute, if the United States conducted its own investigation
or could demonstrate that it has already adequately investigated the conduct
at issue, the case against Americans would likely still be considered
inadmissible.93
Therefore, one recommendation for how the United States could
respond to the possibility of an investigation is for the United States to initiate,
or re-open, investigations into the

88
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90
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situation. 94 The United States has previously investigated allegations of
detainee abuse in Afghanistan and the other pertinent states. Indeed, in 2006
it was reported that the United States
investigations into allegations of mistreatment, and more than 250 individuals
95
[had]
According to the report,
the individuals found liable have been court-martialed, served prison terms up
to ten years, received formal reprimands, or were separated from the
military.96
In light of the fact that the Prosecutor
97
that U.S. armed forces and CIA members
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity that deserve an ICC
investigation, it is to be presumed that the United States
investigation did not incorporate the same conduct at issue or did not satisfy
the requirements of being
endently or impartially [and] in a
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice. 98 Otherwise those investigations would have
satisfied the complementarity exemption making the situation, at least in
regards to the United States
inadmissible.99
Many commentators argue that triggering the doctrine of
complementarity jurisdiction by commencing a domestic investigation is the
United States best response option because it would ensure that to the extent
U.S. nationals are implicated, such wrongdoings are addressed within the U.S.
legal system. 100 As comme
he U.S. has
credible and effective military and civilian investigative capacities and court
systems that should be utilized 101 Others have suggested this would also be
the best case scenario for the ICC because it would avoid a showdown
between the Court and the United States that could severely tarnish the
legitimacy of the Court.102 However, such an investigation would likely have
94
95

Id.
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Statement for U.S. Hearing at Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006) (transcript available from author).
96
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to include the prosecution of senior officials in order to satisfy the
complementarity requirement, a move the United States is highly unlikely to
make.103
C.

Option 3: Refute Jurisdiction as Precluded by Status of Force
Agreements with Afghanistan

As previously discussed, pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity,
the ICC may only assert jurisdiction if the relevant states are unwilling or
unable to pursue the alleged crimes. 104
forward with the investigation against American officials indicates that she
believes both the United States and Afghanistan are unwilling or unable to
investigate and adjudicate the challenged conduct through their domestic
processes, or that such processes have been inadequate. 105 Although the
United States asserts it has conducted independent investigations and
prosecutions regarding the conduct at issue, until more details are released
relating the specifics of the Prose
allegations it is unclear if those
processes involved the same conduct.106
Furthermore, due to several multilateral and bilateral agreements, the
government of Afghanistan has extremely limited legal jurisdiction over U.S.
officials and services members, which makes it unlikely that Afghanistan
would have the authority to pursue the contested conduct pursuant to its own
jurisdiction.107 One such agreement is the NATO Status of Force Agreement
(SOFA). SOFA covers the United States mission to train, advise, and assist
Afghan forces and provides immunity to NATO forces from criminal
prosecution.108 In addition, the United States and Afghanistan negotiated a
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that provides for the continuation of an
earlier U.S.-Afghan SOFA. This agreement granted military and civilian
humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises, and other
103
Mark Kersten,
for the Court, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Nov. 17, 2016) https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/11/17/whateverhappens-the-iccs-investigation-into-us-torture-in-afghanistan-is-a-win-for-thecourt/ (explaining that although high-level officials including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, or John Yoo
would likely fall wit
tigation, the prospect of the United States allowing for
their surrender to The H
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Rome Statute art. 17.
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rom criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities, as well
as immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to
acts performed outside the course of their duties.109
Thus, in light of the obligations created by these agreements, the
Afghan government is contractually unable to pursue the alleged crimes
because it has released its claim to jurisdiction. 110 In an attempt to shield
Americans from foreign jurisdiction, the United States unintendedly opened
the door for the ICC to obtain jurisdiction over the situation at issue. As made
explicit in the Rome Statute, the ICC may only assert its jurisdiction when
states which have jurisdiction over the issue are unwilling or unable to
genuinely prosecute. 111 Afghanistan, as the territory where the conduct
occurred, is the primary state that would absent binding agreements have
original jurisdiction over the situation at issue. 112 Furthermore, because
Afghanistan is a member party of the Rome Statute, the ICC has a stronger
claim to jurisdiction based
prosecute
the accused actors is the result of previously negotiated agreements instead of
an informed decision to choose not to prosecute.113 In accordance with their
treaty agreements, Afghanistan cannot proceed with a prosecution against
Americans covered by either SOFA. Such a circumstance likely contributed
to the Prosecutor conclusion that Afghanistan inability to prosecute did
not bar the ICC from gaining jurisdiction.
However, while the United States SOFA agreements with Afghanistan
against the ICC maintaining legitimate jurisdiction. Professor Michael
Newton of Vanderbilt Law School advanced an argument against ICC
jurisdiction resting upon the legal theory that when Afghanistan entered into

109
110
111
112

Id.
Rome Statute art. 17.
Id.

International Studies: American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court (May 6, 2002)
(expressing the United States
gn nations have the authority to try non-citizens
113
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the SOFAs with the United States in 2002, it ceded criminal jurisdiction over
Americans and therefore cannot delegate that jurisdiction to the ICC.114
The ICC treaty entered into force for Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, after
it deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on February 10,
2003.115
rred after it
voluntarily constrained the scope of its territorial jurisdiction over American
nationals. 116
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals pursuant to several SOFAs with the
United States, Afghanistan cannot lawfully delegate its territorial jurisdiction
to the ICC.117
the nationals of nonterritoriality. 118 Therefore, if Afghanistan no longer possesses criminal
jurisdiction over the American nationals at issue, it is precluded from
transferring such jurisdiction to the ICC.119
understanding that the ICC authority is
exclusively derived from the delegation of state jurisdiction.120 However, such
an assumption is not wholly accepted within the international legal or
scholarly community
Carsten Stahn, a
professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice at Leiden
University, points out an alternative model of how the ICC derives its
jurisdiction.121 Stahn argues that ICC jurisdiction is actually
122
For
more than three centuries, states have exercised universal jurisdiction: a
principle that holds that international law enables each state to assert
jurisdiction over certain crimes, regardless of where they were committed or

114
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115
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by whom, on behalf of the international community. 123 Traditionally,
universal jurisdiction covered mostly acts of piracy, but it has since been
extended to include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity the
very crimes adjudicated by the ICC.124 Therefore, Stahn concludes, the ICC
derives its jurisdiction from universal jurisdiction, rather than by a delegation
of domestic jurisdiction,
United
States exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals does not preclude the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction over the core crimes covered by universal
jurisdiction.125 However, the principle of universal jurisdiction was rejected
during the Rome debates and was not included in the Rome Statute leaving an
avenue for the United States to proffer the absence of Afghanistan jurisdiction
as a basis for the lack of ICC jurisdiction.126
In order to substantiate the United States
jurisdiction over its nationals based on the SOFAs it has with Afghanistan,
either the United States or Afghanistan must provide the agreement to the
Prosecutor for consideration.127 The SOFA signed between Afghanistan and
the United States is confidential and Afghanistan deposited its instrument of
accession to the Rome Statute without mention of the SOFA; further,
Afghanistan accepted the treaty without reservations to the exercise of ICC
jurisdiction over crimes listed in the Rome Statute committed on Afghanistan
soil after May 2003.128
person or a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued, a State that
has jurisdiction over a case on the grounds of complementarity, or a State from
which acceptance of jurisdiction is required.129 While the United States could
bring a jurisdictional challenge on basis of complementarity, it could not raise
the argument that the SOFAs bar prosecution because the United States does
not qualify as a State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under
123
Dalila V. Hoover, Universal Jurisdiction Not So Universal: A Time to Delegate to the International
Criminal Court 5 (Cornell Law Sch. Paper No. 52 2011), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=lps_clacp.
124
Id. at 6.
125
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126
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, L. FARE BLOG
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127
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Article 12
a States Parties, because that is where the alleged conduct occurred.130
A challenge to the admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court
must take place prior to or at the commencement of the trial;131 before there
has been a confirmation of the charges, the challenges must be referred to the
Pre-Trial Chamber.132 As such, one of the United States options in response
to the investigation is to ensure that a party capable of raising the challenge
presents the assertion 133 that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over the accused
Americans based on the legal theory that the SOFAs between the United
States and Afghanistan preclude the ICC from asserting jurisdiction.134 Such
a challenge would need to be made to the Pre-Trial Chamber immediately in
order to prevent the Court from moving forward with the investigation.135
D.

Option 4: Comply with the Investigation

One of the United States
or media discussion is compliance. This option has been mostly ignored for
good reason analysts agree that the United States will never cooperate with
an ICC investigation against its armed forces. 136 The appointment of John
Bolton, a longtime critic of the ICC, as National Security Advisor practically
cements such predictions.137 Washington actors, including Bolton, looking to
tell the
138
Court

130
Id. Assuming the ICC is exercising proper jurisdiction on the basis of Afghanistan being a party to
the Statute and the condu
g to the Rome Statute,
the United States
131
Id. art. 19 ¶¶ 4, 6.
132
Id.
133
See id. art. 12.
134
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However, while such a strategy has the potential to shine a light on the
feebleness of an international court that lacks global participation or teeth
sharp enough to have an effective bite, this stance could backfire for the
United States.139 The Court, with full knowledge of the United States
regarding its jurisdiction, has taken brave steps to fulfill its statutory duties
it is
140
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of
If the ICC
is unable to properly investigate or prosecute Americans, the blame will fall
at the feet of Washington, not the ICC. But, in addition to avoiding blame for
a failed investigation, the United States should comply with the Court in an
effort to reset its human rights agenda and honor its founding commitment to
justice.141 If the investigation results in allegations and indictments against
American actors, the U.S.
efforts to bring justice to victims of war crimes.
A missing component of the discussion regarding the United States
options in response to this investigation is the necessity of U.S. compliance
for victims to access justice. The ICC is unique among international criminal
tribunals in that victims and those with
interests [or that] are affect
by
the proceedings determine
witnesses.142 The Statute explicitly provides for the possibility of victims to
make representations when the Prosecutor, as in this case, seeks propio moto
authorization to open an investigation. 143 The Court received 245
representations on behalf of more than 700 thousand victims by the January
31, 2018 deadline for voluntary victim representations related to the Afghan
investigation. These representations are critical to the Pre139
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141
human rights agenda has floundered in recent decades: it has the largest
incarcerated population in the world, which is often attributed to excessive and discriminatory sentencing
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population; drastic cuts in refugee programs and dramatic increases in deportations has resulted in family
separation and in many cases an inability for individuals to escape violent or dire situations in their home
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continues to hold thirty-one men at the facility who have been there for over a decade without being charged.
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decision because in order to move forward with a full investigation and
possible prosecution, the Pre-Trial Chamber must be convinced that such a
decision is in the interest of justice.144
145

Therefore, it is important for the Court to know how many victims
agree with prosecution, but also, how many victims would not want the
prosecution to occur. Of the representations made on behalf of hundreds of
thousand victims, just two families, comprising 20 victims, and 30 other
individuals said they did not want an investigation.146
The United States has positioned itself within the international
community in such a spot that any course of action other than compliance
would harm its reputation as one of the traditional champions of human rights.
As an integral player in war crime tribunals147 and peacekeeping missions,148
the United States puts itself out as a defender of personal accountability and
justice for victims of war crimes. However, its continued hypocritical stance
as an enforcer against all but its own crimes has taken a toll on the United
149
States
Take for example the pressure the United
States put on Balkan countries to turn over indicted person to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Two weeks after
requiring Serbia to demonstrate full compliance with the ICTY in order to
receive further U.S. assistance, the United States suspended military aid due
foreign jurisdiction similar to the one currently in force between
Afghanistan and America. 150 In response, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran

144
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people that on the one hand we will sign a bilateral agreement with the United
States in which we agree to protect their citizens, while at the same time we
151
The more vociferously
negative the U.S. response is to an investigation involving its own citizens,
the
to the
detriment of the reputation of the United States.
As a nation that calls for the prosecution of war criminals before the
Court, conditions foreign aid on human rights, and even engages in military
intervention based on human rights violations, the United States must
demonstrate that it holds to its convictions even against its own citizens.
Former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer said
in a speech at the Centre of Human Rights in South Africa that the United
152
States
bilities and . . .
f a nation, whether a party or not to the Rome
Treaty, acts irresponsibly and wages massive crimes against its own people or
those of another nation, then we have no interest in permitting such a nation
to enjoy any special privilege; let that nation's war criminals stand trial before
the ICC. 153 The United States
investigation would weaken its authority to oppose torture and other abuses
abroad and would set an example that countries will point to in the future to
justify obstruction.
In addition to political and moral justifications for compliance, in this
circumstance,
would also likely be
the most strategic position the United States could take in order to preserve
the validity of their arguments against joining the ICC.
One of the United States most frequently cited justifications for
refusing to become a State Party of the Rome Statute is the fear that Americans
would become vulnerable as political targets for prosecution and such would
chill the United States
world.154 In December
of 2014, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein released
151
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detention and interrogation program
investigation.155 Declassified portions of the Senate Summary made public
include a redacted 499-page report that describes in detail many of the
interrogation methods used on CIA detainees. 156 These methods included
eping detainees
and
waterboarding.157 While the Obama administration asserted that it conducted
a criminal investigation of the CIA program, the investigation was closed
without questioning current or former detainees and did not result in any
criminal charges. 158 Considering that
variety of actors instead of solely Americans and that the United States was
concerned by the same conduct at issue enough to conduct its own
investigation, the potential probe by the ICC is clearly not one motivated by
political pretext.
As such, compliance would signal that under circumstances in which
the Court is working as intended and as openly supported by the United
States the United States will work to further their aligned goals. 159
Moreover, because the Rome Statute provides for non-members to waive
jurisdictional challenges for specific investigations while maintaining claims
to sovereignty otherwise, 160 if the Court was ever used as a political tool
against the United States, the United States
would be made stronger by their previous cooperation.
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Additionally, U.S. compliance would allow for greater control over
how, and in some ways what, information or evidence is provided to the Court.
This would not be the first time the ICC conducted an investigation from the
outside. The Sudanese government similarly resisted the 2005 investigation
into the Sudan/Darfur situation.161 This was the first situation to be referred to
the ICC by the United Nations Security Council, and the first investigation in
the territory of a non-State Party to the Rome Statute. 162 Alex Whiting, a
professor at Harvard Law School and a former senior official in the
P
when
does not have
163

To date, not a single high-level U.S. official from civilian leadership,
military, CIA, or private contractor has been prosecuted for war crimes or
crimes against humanity.164 The ICC investigation could finally change that
bringing an end to the impunity U.S. officials have enjoyed and, critically,
some measure of redress to victims of the U.S. torture program. 165 A
successful investigation, one that is not foreclosed by the United States
refusal to cooperate, would send a clear message to victims of egregious
crimes that they have recourse through an independent and impartial process,
and to perpetrators of such crimes, that no one is above the law. Furthermore,
if the United States is confident that its investigation into the allegations was
sufficient and that American nationals did not violate international law, then
it should be confident the ICC will, after a robust and unobstructed
investigation, come to the same conclusion. Cooperating with an ICC
investigation, regardless of the outcome, bolsters the United States
within the international community because it signals a commitment to the
rule of law and sets a new tone for what is expected from nations States
Parties and nonmembers alike that harbor war criminals.
III.

CONCLUSION

If the Pre-Trial Chamber approves the P
formal investigation into the situation in Afghanistan and such an
161
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investigation includes allegations against American officials, the United
States response will likely play a critical role in
jurisdictional authority moving forward. Three of the United States likely
response options based on its past and current relationship with the ICC
include: (1) declining to cooperate with the ICC based on a denial of
jurisdiction due to a lack of U.S. consent; (2) negating
on the basis that the situation is inadmissible to the Court pursuant to the
doctrine of complementarity; or (3) contesting
precluded by binding agreements made between the United States and
Afghanistan. Each of these responses find footing in legal arguments centered
on the tension between international jurisdiction and sovereignty. However,
waiving jurisdictional challenges specific to this investigation, the United
States has a fourth option: compliance. Although unlikely to actualize, this
course would position the United States as a global leader for human rights,
bolster any future efforts to enforce prosecution against international
criminals, and provide much needed recourse to victims of war crimes.
While a formal investigation into the Afghanistan situation would not
be limited to American conduct and many of the atrocities at issue were
carried out by non-U.S. actors, if Americans violated international law, they
should be held accountable and the United States should not shield them by
refusing to comply with the Court. Such refusal, based on any legal or political
argument regarding jurisdiction, tarnishes the United States
the international community and weakens its legitimacy to participate in
future efforts to vindicate the rights of victims of similar crimes.

